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REPLY
REVISITING THE TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Gregg D. Polsky* and Dan Markel**
N our recent article, Taxing Punitive Damages,' we argued (i) that
plaintiffs in punitive damages cases should be allowed to intro-
duce to the jury evidence regarding the deductibility of those dam-
ages by defendants, and (ii) that this jury tax-awareness approach is
better than the Obama Administration's suggested alternative of
disallowing those deductions.2 To our delight, Professor Larry
Zelenak and Paul Mogin have each provided comments to our
piece. 3 Professor Zelenak's thoughtful response focuses on our pre-
scriptive claim that jury tax-awareness is better than nondeductibil-
ity while Mr. Mogin disputes our doctrinal claim that the tax evi-
* Willie Person Mangum Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
** D'Alemberte Professor, Florida State University College of Law and Scholar in Resi-
dence, New York University Center on the Administration of Criminal Law. Thanks to
John Coyle and Brant Hellwig for comments on an earlier draft and to Phillip Kovoor
and Meg Powers for research assistance.
1 Gregg D. Polsky & Dan Markel, Taxing Punitive Damages, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1295 (2010).
2 The Obama Administration again proposed making punitive damages nondeductible
in its 2012 budget proposal, which was released on February 14, 2011. Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal
Year 2012 (2011), available at
http: //www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/ omb/budget/fy20 12 /assets/budget.p
df.
3 See Paul Mogin, Don't Tilt the Playing Field: A Response to Polsky and Markel, 96 Va.
L. Rev. In Brief 69 (2011); Lawrence Zelenak, Of Punitive Damages, Tax Deductions, and
Tax-Aware Juries: A Response To PolskyAnd Markel, 96 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 61 (2011).
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dence is admissible.4 We thank them for their contributions and
provide our replies below.
1. REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZELENAK
Professor Zelenak raises two challenges in response to our piece
and offers a general reaction, as well. We address these in turn.
A. Divorcing the Tax Treatment ofJudgments and Settlements
Although we are pleased by Professor Zelenak's general approval
of our analysis, 5 we note our disagreement with his view that the
preferable solution might be to disallow deductions for payments of
punitive damage judgments, while still allowing full deductions for
settlements that include a punitive damages component.
Professor Zelenak's alternative proposal would avoid the practi-
cal problems we describe in Taxing Punitive Damages relating to al-
locations of pretrial settlements because settlements would always
be deductible in full. Also, as Professor Zelenak notes, the vast ma-
jority of fully litigated cases do not involve an award of punitive
damages. 6 Accordingly, his proposal's "presumption" that settled
amounts do not have a punitive damages component will usually be
accurate.
Nonetheless, we still prefer our proposal over Professor Zelenak's
suggestion. First, while it is true that the majority of cases do not in-
volve a substantial punitive damages component (because most
cases do not involve sufficiently egregious misconduct to warrant a
threshold determination of malice or recklessness), the empirical
reality is that some cases certainly do. In those "punitive-flavored"
cases, defendants will, under Professor Zelenak's proposal, be able
to avoid the full sting of their expected punishment simply by set-
tling before a jury verdict; the resulting underpunishment effect is
4 Zelenak, supra note 3, at 61-62; Mogin, supra note 3, at 69-70.
5 See Zelenak, supra note 3, at 62.
6 See id. at 63-64. However, even though the punitive damages rate in fully litigated
cases is two to three percent, the proportion of settled cases that involve a punitive
damages component is likely significantly higher because of various tax, public rela-
tions, and insurance considerations . See Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into
Compensation: In the Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 211, 228 (arguing
that, in light of these considerations, "it is almost a wonder that any punitive damages
claim goes to trial"); see also infra note 10.
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precisely the problem that has stimulated the various reform pro-
posals. 7 In other words, while Professor Zelenak's proposal attempts
to solve the underpunishment problem by disallowing deductions
for paying punitive damages judgments, it simultaneously allows an
extremely easy end-run: settle before the jury comes back for the
expected jury award.8 In fact, we expect that in practice Professor
Zelenak's approach would work almost precisely like the Obama
Administration's blanket nondeductibility approach. Under the
blanket nondeductibility approach, it would be nearly impossible
for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to find and prosecute those
relatively few heavily punitive-flavored cases because both plaintiffs
and defendants have significant incentives to downplay punitives at
the point of settlement-a point we emphasized in our article.9 Ac-
cordingly, the IRS would likely be successful in enforcing the nonde-
ductibility rule only in those cases that have resulted in a jury ver-
dict of punitive damages. Thus, Professor Zelenak's proposal merely
formalizes the IRS practices that are expected under the Obama
Administration's approach. As a result, our principal objection to
both proposals is the same: they both permit easy circumvention of
the solution to the underpunishment problem. 10
7 In all the other non-punitive-flavored cases, all of the proposals (ours, the Obama Ad-
ministration's, and Professor Zelenak's), as well as current law, will have essentially the
same effects.
8 For discussion of whether such an incentive to settle might be beneficial, see Polsky &
Markel, supra note 1, at 1346-47.
9 Id. at 1330-41.
10 In support of his proposal for allowing deductions for the punitive portions of pretri-
al settlements, Professor Zelenak argues that "the very small percentage of punitive
damage awards in litigated cases suggests that a large proportion of defendants making
payments to settle punitive damages claims would not have been found liable for puni-
tive damages at trial." Zelenak, supra note 3, at 64. Professor Zelenak appears to be
concerned about the risk of overpunishment in cases where punitive damages are not
warranted. However, settlements should take into account the risk-adjusted amount of
expected punitive damages that would be awarded by the jury (or judge) if the case
went to trial, which should resolve any concerns of overpunishment. If anything, the
expected punitive damages amount is a better indicator of punishment-worthiness
than what the jury actually decides in a one-off decision. Furthermore, as mentioned
above in note 6, it is reasonable to expect that punitive-flavored cases settle at a sub-
stantially higher rate than other cases because of insurance, public relations, and tax
concerns. See Baker, supra note 6, at 228. This means that the low incidence of actual
punitive damage jury verdicts is not suggestive of the incidence of verdicts that would
result if all potential punitive damages cases proceeded to trial. Finally, we note that
very recent empirical studies conclude that, even in the small subset of punitive dam-
ages cases that do proceed to trial, the success rate of plaintiffs seeking punitive dam-
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Second, while Professor Zelenak's proposal has the virtue of not
even pretending to enforce the nondeductibility rule in settlements
(unlike the Obama Administration's proposal), it is not devoid of
administrative problems. Professor Zelenak's proposal would deny
deductions for payment of punitive damages judgments. But what if
the case settles after the jury verdict but before the judge formally
enters the judgment? Does it matter if there remain outstanding le-
gal issues, such as whether the judge ought to reduce the judgment
or order a new trial, at the time of settlement? Likewise, what if the
case settles after the judgment is entered but while it is being ap-
pealed? For instance, what if the judgment is for $1,000,000 of com-
pensatory damages and $2,000,000 of punitive damages, and the
case settles for $500,000 or $1,000,000 or $1,500,000 while on ap-
peal? Does it matter whether both the plaintiff and the defendant
have appealed, such that a new trial could conceivably end up with a
larger recovery for the plaintiff? The point is that even a seemingly
bright line rule like "punitive damage judgments are nondeductible
but settlement payments are" can be difficult to apply in a whole
slew of cases. As a result of this difficulty, it can be gamed by the
parties to their mutual advantage.
Furthermore, to the extent the rule becomes more formalistic (for
example, by applying nondeductibility only where a formal judg-
ment is entered), the end-run strategy becomes that much clearer
(for example, simply settle before the judge enters the judgment).
Meanwhile, if the rule is less formalistic (for example, by applying a
rule of reason to apportion post-judgment settlements pending ap-
peal), the rule operates more like the Obama Administration's pro-
ages is actually about thirty percent, which is much higher than the two to three per-
cent statistic noted by Professor Zelenak. The difference is attributable to the fact that
plaintiffs only seek punitive damages in ten percent of the cases that go to trial, reflect-
ing the screening that plaintiffs do before pleading punitive damages. See Theodore Ei-
senberg et al., The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 2 J. Legal
Analysis 577 (2010) (noting that plaintiffs' lawyers in fact only seek punitive damages
in roughly ten percent of the cases that go to trial, and then in fact win punitive damag-
es in about thirty percent of the cases generally and roughly sixty percent of cases in-
volving intentional torts such as fraud). Based on the thirty to sixty percent trial suc-
cess rate and the high settlement rate of punitive damages cases, we disagree with
Professor Zelenak's claim that "[i]t is surely true that, in many settlements with a puni-
tive component (whether acknowledged or unacknowledged by the parties), the likeli-
hood that a jury would have awarded punitive damages if there had been a trial is well
below fifty percent." Zelenak, supra note 3, at 63.
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posal. Either way, we prefer our rule, which neutralizes the tax con-
sequences between paying settlements and paying judgments.
B. What About Optimal Deterrence and Punitive Damages?
Professor Zelenak also argues that our proposed solution to the
underpunishment problem, like other solutions, would be inappo-
site if the current punitive damages system were designed to
achieve optimal deterrence." We wholeheartedly agree with this
view and said as much in the piece itself' 2 and in a companion piece
authored by one of us.13 Our proposal is premised on current puni-
tive damages regimes, 14 which, by requiring a threshold showing of
reprehensibility, very clearly do not attempt to achieve optimal de-
terrence.' 5 Indeed both proponents and critics of the idea of using
punitive damages to achieve optimal deterrence acknowledge that
the current landscape does not even remotely resemble an optimal
deterrence regime. 16 Consequently, readers interested in a compre-
hensive analysis of the proper tax treatment of punitive damages
meant to achieve optimal deterrence should consult Professor Mar-
kel's companion article.' 7
C. Solving the Puzzle of the Twenty Dollar Bill Found on the Street
Last, Professor Zelenak asks why, if evidence of tax consequences
is both admissible and useful to plaintiffs' lawyers, it has not been
sought to be admitted.' 8 We share his curiosity. Anecdotally, we
have heard a number of conjectures ranging from "litigators don't
11 Zelenak, supra note 3, at 65-67.
12 Polsky & Markel, supra note 1, at 1312 n.37.
13 See Dan Markel, Overcoming Tradeoffs in the Taxation of Punitive Damages, 88
Wash. U. L. Rev. 609 (2011).
14 See Polsky & Markel, supra note 1, at 1324 (noting that our tax analysis is based on
current tort law principles).
15 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 869, 897 (1998) (noting that optimal deterrence regimes are unconcerned
with proof of the defendant's reprehensibility as such).
16 Compare id. at 896-97 (acknowledging that current punitive damages law is flatly
inconsistent with promotion of optimal deterrence), with Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive
Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 957 (2007) ("[I]t is very hard to make
a convincing case for the current practice of punitive damages based on a theory of effi-
cient deterrence.").
17 Markel, supra note 13.
18 Zelenak, supra note 3, at 68.
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think about tax" and "litigators lack imagination" to "it's too complex
for juries" and "tax evidence is generally inadmissible." We have at-
tempted to show that it is not all that complex and that this particu-
lar type of tax evidence should be admissible.19 As to lack of imagi-
nation or education, our hope is that our article should solve that
problem to the extent it exists.
II. REPLY TO MR. MOGIN
As noted at the outset, we argue that under current law, evidence
of punitive damages tax deductibility ought to be admissible against
the defendant in cases where those damages are deductible. In his
response to this claim, Mr. Mogin, an experienced advocate with an
extensive practice in defending corporations against punitive dam-
ages awards, raises several issues, which we take up in turn below.
A. The Concerns About Symmetry Between Plaintiffs and Defendants
Mr. Mogin first registers concern that our analysis "would create a
substantial pro-plaintiff imbalance."20 The purported imbalance
stems from the fact that while tax evidence regarding plaintiffs is
generally inadmissible by defendants, we are asserting that punitive
damages tax evidence regarding defendants is admissible. In our ar-
ticle, we address this precise argument and we would call Mr. Mo-
gin's attention to that discussion; in fact, it is the first counterargu-
ment we discuss and we devote three full pages to it.21 Given that we
19 Polsky & Markel, supra note 1, at 1313-15, 1321-22.
20 Mogin, supra note 3, at 70. The title of Mr. Mogin's piece implies that there is current-
ly an even playing field between plaintiffs and business defendants in tort cases that
would be endangered by our analysis. Many have strongly disagreed with this premise.
See, e.g., In Litigation: Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead? (Herbert M. Kritzer & Su-
san Silbey eds., 2003); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behav-
ior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1183 (1992)
("One of the most remarkable features of the tort system is how few plaintiffs there are.
A great many potential plaintiffs are never heard from by the injurers or their insur-
ers."); see also Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 Ohio St. L.J.
443 (1987); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 Md. L. Rev.
1093, 1159 (1996) (stating that "relatively few" tort claims are brought to court and
that, even if more claims were filed, the tort system may not have the capacity to handle
them). Moreover, the wave of "tort reform" over the last two decades has almost cer-
tainly not been tilted in the direction of plaintiffs.
21 Polsky & Markel, supra note 1, at 1310-13.
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fully develop the response in our article, we will merely provide the
Cliff's Notes version here.
While the symmetry argument touted by Mr. Mogin is superficial-
ly attractive, it breaks down once one considers the reasons that
courts are reluctant to allow defendants to introduce tax evidence
against plaintiffs. First, there is the complexity concern, which Mr.
Mogin notes. We argue that the punitive damages tax evidence
sought to be introduced by plaintiffs is not complex and certainly
not as complex as the tax evidence that defendants have sought to
introduce. 22 Second, and more significantly, we note how courts
faced with admitting plaintiff-related tax evidence are forced into a
dilemma: they can either overcompensate plaintiffs (by disallowing
the tax evidence) or underdeter defendants (by allowing the tax ev-
idence).23
Both options are theoretically unsatisfying from a conventional
torts policy perspective. Faced with this unfortunate choice in the
context of compensatory damages, courts generally (but not univer-
sally) choose to overcompensate plaintiffs by excluding the evi-
dence. But, in the punitive damages context, there simply is no such
dilemma because the focus is on punishing and completely deterring
the defendant's malicious or reckless misconduct; the plaintiffs en-
richment is simply an incidental by-product of those goals. As we
show in our article, courts can thus either advance existing punitive
damages policy by educating juries about tax effects or undermine it
by obscuring the fact that there are tax deductions available to busi-
ness defendants that pay punitive damages. 24
In addition, as we argued, it is clear that there is no blanket rule
about tax evidence admissibility.25 In some contexts and jurisdic-
tions, the tax evidence is excluded; in others, it is admitted. The
trend appears to be towards admissibility. 26 Regardless, like all rel-
22 See id. at 1313-15 (comparing the complexity resulting from introducing punitive
damages tax evidence with the complexity from introducing other tax evidence).
23 See id. at 1311-12; see also Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 143,
146 (1992) (explaining the dilemma).
24 Polsky & Markel, supra note 1, at 1311-12.
25 See id. at 1312-13 (noting the lack of uniformity regarding tax evidence admissibil-
ity).
26 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 871 (7th ed. 2000)
(noting that despite early tort cases that excluded tax evidence, "[m]ore recent cases ...
have tended both to take taxes into account and to instruct the jury of that fact"). For
specific recent examples, see Eshelman v. Agere Sys. Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 440-43 (3d Cir.
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evant evidence, a very good reason should be required to keep it
away from juries. None exists with respect to punitive damages tax
evidence.
Mr. Mogin also points to the collateral source rule as another rule
where juries are precluded from hearing certain evidence that, like
evidence regarding the plaintiffs taxes, relates to the plaintiffs true
harm. Again, the argument seems to be that it is unfair to exclude
this pro-defendant evidence while admitting our suggested pro-
plaintiff evidence. But again, there is a plausible policy reason for
the collateral source rule: the concern about underdeterrence. When
courts apply the collateral source rule, they are saying that it is
more important to properly incentivize defendants than it is to ac-
curately compensate plaintiffs. 27 While everyone may not agree with
this view, it is undoubtedly plausible. On the other hand, there is no
justifiable policy rationale to keep juries in the dark about the tax ef-
fects of punitive damage payments by defendants.
B. Defendant's Wealth and Punitive Damages
Mr. Mogin next argues that "existing law is already skewed in fa-
vor of overly large punitive awards against organizational defend-
2009) (augmenting an award to counteract adverse tax consequences suffered by the
plaintiff in a federal discrimination lawsuit); Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aero-
space Workers, Dist. No. 160, 87 P.3d 757, 761-64 (Wash. 2004) (allowing similar
augmentation under Washington state discrimination law); see also Gregg D. Polsky &
Stephen F. Befort, Employment Discrimination Remedies and Tax Gross Ups, 90 Iowa L.
Rev. 67 (2004) (discussing award augmentations for tax effects under federal discrimi-
nation statutes).
27 See Dodge, supra note 23, at 172 n.142 (noting that "the collateral source rule is ac-
cepted in order to impose a proper level of deterrence on defendants, even though the
effect of the rule is to overcompensate plaintiffs"); Thomas C. Galligan, Disaggregating
More-Than-Whole Damages in Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71
Tenn. L. Rev. 117, 123 (2003) (explaining that "the collateral source rule leads to more
efficient deterrence than nonrecovery of the loss because it forces defendants to take
account of these reimbursed losses or costs before acting"); Robert A. Katz, Too Much
of a Good Thing: When Charitable Gifts Augment Victim Compensation, 53 DePaul L.
Rev. 547, 584 n.191 (2003) ("A key rationale for the collateral source rule... is effi-
ciency: to achieve optimal deterrence, tortfeasors must bear the full costs of their risky
behavior, even if this overcompensates the occasional tort victim."); Paul H. Rubin &
Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 J. L. & Econ. 221, 226
(2007) (stating that collateral source rules "promote efficient deterrence by requiring
tortfeasors to pay damages even when victims have received payments from a collat-
eral source").
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ants because of the way it treats evidence of wealth."28 In our piece,
we addressed the argument that tax blindness is justified on the
ground that punitive damage amounts are "too large."29 Unfortu-
nately, Mr. Mogin provides no benchmark or analysis as to what is
the optimal amount of punitive damages for society to have.30 Even
assuming arguendo that punitive damages are too high, solving that
problem through tax blindness is extremely imprecise because the
blunting effect depends idiosyncratically on the defendant's margin-
al tax rate.3
C. How Important is the Intent of the Jury (or Judge)?
Mr. Mogin also argues that the jury's intent in a punitive damages
case is not "critically important."32 We disagree. Under our system,
the jury hears the evidence and, absent exceptional circumstances,
determines the punishment. Given that responsibility, the jury (or
the judge in certain situations) should be educated as much as rea-
sonably possible to the real, after-tax cost of the punishment. While
we firmly agree with Mr. Mogin that judicial review of jury determi-
nations is appropriate, we would add that appellate judges should
28 Mogin, supra note 3, at 73.
29 See Polsky & Markel, supra note 1, at 1317-18.
30 In this respect, he becomes exposed to the kind of critique Anthony Sebok made so
effectively in Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 957, 962-76
(2007).
31 See Polsky & Markel, supra note 1, at 1318. Mr. Mogin endorses the view that the
wealth of punitive damages defendants should never be admitted into evidence. As
previously mentioned, our article is premised on the current state of punitive damages
law, which nearly universally allows this evidence. See generally TXO Prod. Corp. v. Al-
liance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993) (describing as "well-settled law" that
financial evidence is admissible in the punitive damages context). Accordingly, we will
not respond to this claim by Mr. Mogin in depth but, as courts and commentators
acknowledge, there are a number of reasons why wealth and size should matter for pu-
nitive damages. For a sampling, see generally Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347
F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (noting that a wealthy defendant can "mount
an extremely aggressive defense.., and by doing so ... make litigating against it very
costly, which in turn may make it difficult for the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to
handle their case, involving as it does only modest stakes, for the usual 33%-40% con-
tingent fee"); Dan Markel, Punitive Damages and Private Ordering Fetishism, 158 U. Pa.
L. Rev. PENNumbra 283, 288-91 (2010).
32 Mogin, supra note 3, at 75.
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also be tax-aware and consider after-tax effects in assessing the con-
stitutional implications of large punitive damage awards.33
CONCLUSION
We are grateful to Professor Zelenak and Mr. Mogin for their re-
sponses and to the Virginia Law Review for the opportunity to con-
tinue the conversation about this important and difficult set of is-
sues.
33 See Polsky & Markel, supra note 1, at 1322-24 (arguing that appellate judges should
be tax-aware in assessing the due process issues stemming from punitive damages
awards).
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